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1. Introduction 
 
Migration from Africa to Europe is not a new phenomenon: migrants have been leaving the 
Maghreb region for Europe since the 1960s – often in response to the demand for low-skilled 
labour in Europe – and in the 1990s migrants from these countries have increasingly been 
accompanied by people from sub-Saharan Africa, joining the former in their attempts to cross 
the Mediterranean. Migration routes have been changing over time, Libya first being a key 
destination for migrants from North Africa as well as sub-Sahara Africa from where to cross 
the sea, later trans-Saharan migration routes shifted towards Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco 
(De Haas 2008). In addition, the composition of migrants (i.e. economic migrants and asylum 
seekers) has seen changes as a consequence of changing intercontinental and national 
circumstances: factors as diverse as war, famine and economic conditions have led people to 
leave their countries (Schapendonk 2012). The fact that large numbers of people are fleeing to 
Europe, often taking high risks in undertaking their journeys which sometimes end in 
humanitarian catastrophes, has recently directed considerable attention to European 
approaches towards migration. Although the European Union has been developing a common 
immigration and asylum system since 1999, it has often been criticized for not adequately 
addressing the problem and for unequally burdening certain European countries. In addition, 
wide divergences in perceptions and policy implementation continue to exist among the 
Member States (see e.g. Klepp 2010; Mainwaring 2012; Grey 2013; Langford 2013; Vellutti 
2014). 
 At the other side of the Mediterranean, Africa has even been struggling harder to 
address the problems it has been facing as a consequence of migration and (internal) 
displacements. While Africa has often been depicted as the continent ‘producing’ migrants 
and asylum-seekers, the fact that African intra-continental migration and displacements 
constitute a much larger part of the total African migration flows than African migration to 
Europe has often been overlooked. Disentangling the causes of migration within Africa shows 
that these are multidimensional and tend to overlap, and in some cases also reinforce each 
other. Conflict, human rights abuses, political unrest, poverty, environmental degradation and 
natural disasters are often interrelated and have contributed to large numbers of people fleeing 
their country or looking for better opportunities elsewhere. Yet, states hosting asylum-seekers, 
refugees and economic migrants have experienced considerable social, financial and security 
challenges as a consequence. Another issue concerns the so-called ‘brain drain’, leaving 
African countries without the qualified people they desperately need (Maru 2009). Despite – 
and arguably also because of – the fact that many African States lack the needed resources to 
adequately deal with migration, they have in the context of the African Union taken efforts to 
develop a common approach to the issue. 
The recognition of mutual interdependence led the European Union and the African 
Union to decide to cooperate in addressing the problems associated with migration. Under the 
umbrella of the Joint Africa-EU strategy which was launched in 2007, the Partnership for 
Migration, Mobility and Employment was established. Notably, the Commission emphasized 
the new position Africa had taken on the world stage: “Africa is now at the heart of 
international politics, but what is genuinely new is that Africa – and the African Union (AU) 
in particular –is emerging, not as a development issue, but as a political actor in its own right” 
(European Commission 2007). Being aware of the skepticism in Africa regarding European 
intentions  –  originating from European colonialism – the EU has put considerable effort in 
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creating the impression that the Partnership really is a partnership rather than an unequal 
relationship: in its communications it frequently uses terminology as ‘joint action’ 
‘interdependence’ and ‘co-ownership’. Although one could certainly have reasons to be 
skeptical regarding European motivations to ‘cooperate’ with Africa, it should also be 
considered that regarding establishing beneficial relationships with the continent, Europe is 
facing increasing competition from other international actors like China. This would in turn 
be a reason for the European Union to be more sensitive with regard to the way it approaches 
Africa (Olivier 2012), which would also mean taking into consideration and paying serious 
attention to the benefits the Partnership on migration could bring to Africa. This thesis will be 
concerned with examining the approach the European Union Member States have taken 
regarding immigration and asylum issues, how this is reflected in European Union policy, and 
in turn, whether the European Union has eventually tried to ‘upload’ its preferences to the 
level of the African Union (or whether it has indeed taken a more ‘social’ approach). The 
research question is thus as follows: 
 
How have the different interests of EU member states influenced EU immigration and asylum 
policy and has the EU in turn tried to influence the African Union’s policy in this field, and if 
so, in what way? 
 
In an attempt to answer this question, the legislative frameworks and policy-making processes 
of in particular the European Union – and to a slightly lesser extent of the African Union – 
will be examined. The following chapter will outline the methodology of this research, and 
subsequently, the theoretical framework will be provided. The next chapter outlines the 
development of the European Union immigration and asylum policy, particularly focusing on 
policies aiming at harmonization. The following chapter will consist of three case studies: 
scrutinizing the development of three policies in the field of illegal and legal migration and 
asylum, it aims to shed light on the influence of Member State preferences (Germany, Malta 
and Slovakia) on final policy outcomes. The last part of the thesis will outline African Union 
achievements in developing a common response to Africa’s migration challenges, and will 
consider this in the broader context of European approaches and in particular, the European 
approach regarding its partnership with Africa. The final chapter will present concluding 
remarks and will pay attention to the challenges ahead.   
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2. Methodology 
 
One of the most important reasons for choosing this topic and for formulating this particular 
research question, is that the literature so far does not seem to have dealt with the question 
directly: although much research has been concerned with the development of the common 
European asylum and migration system and focuses on interaction dynamics between the EU 
institutions, the way the EU has approached Africa with regard to the Partnership on 
Migration has been poorly documented, and has not been considered in the broader context of 
European Union and African Union policy-making. This thesis will be of a qualitative nature, 
and aims to outline the key policy achievements of both organizations (and achievements 
regarding their cooperation) made during the last 15 years. EU Member states’ influence on 
the shaping of European policies will be illustrated by analyzing the bargaining process of 
three Directives concluded in the context of the development of the common European policy. 
In the field of illegal migration, the Returns Directive will be outlined, regarding legal 
migration the Blue Card Directive will be scrutinized, and lastly, regarding asylum policy, the 
Recast Asylum Qualification Directive will be analyzed. The Returns Directive has been 
chosen because this constitutes the key achievement in the field of illegal migration; the same 
applies to the Blue Card Directive, which has been the only significant achievement during 
the analyzed policy-making period. Lastly, the Recast Asylum Qualification Directive is 
selected since this legislative measure has been regarded to constitute the core of the asylum 
system. To be clear: the choice for the recast and not for the first version of the Directive is 
related to the fact that the countries chosen for analysis include countries that became EU 
member after the first phase of policy-making: they thus did not participate in the negotiations 
on the first Directive.  
In order to be able to effectively scrutinize how and to what extent different national 
interests have shaped EU policy, three countries have been selected which are expected to 
have completely different interests and which occupy different positions within the Union: 
Germany, Malta and Slovakia. Germany, one of the key players in the EU, is known as an 
‘immigration country’; it constitutes the most popular EU destination for migrants (Green 
2013). Malta shows a very different case: being a country with relatively little power, it has 
been struggling to cope with mainly African migrants arriving at its coast. Emphasizing its 
small size and incapacity to deal with migratory inflows, it has frequently asked for EU 
support. The last country is Slovakia, which is one of the EU countries with the lowest 
immigration rates and consequently, does not seem to have experienced considerable issues in 
this field. In order to assess how Member States preferences have been shaped and to what 
extent they have eventually influenced EU policies, use will be made of the theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism developed by Moravcsik – focusing on how domestic preferences are 
shaped, which factors determine interstate bargaining outcomes and what motivates states to 
pool or delegate sovereignty to supranational institutions. Due to the fact that Moravcsik’s 
framework is developed with a focus on economic integration, it is sometimes necessary to 
slightly depart from the theory in order to include relevant elements for analysis. This will 
however be further outlined in the following chapter in which the theoretical framework is 
presented. 
 This thesis aims to shed light on how policies have been shaped over time, and in 
doing so use has been made of primary and secondary resources. With regard to the chapter 
on the development of the common EU immigration and asylum policy, use has mainly been 
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made of analyses of scholars who have often conducted interviews in order to track policy 
developments and positions and achievements of individual Member States. The same applies 
to the chapter on AU policy and AU-EU cooperation. In both chapters, I have also used 
original policy documents. With regard to the chapter in which the case studies are conducted, 
Council documents like minutes on working party outcomes and proposals of the Directives 
have been used as much as possible. However, these documents are rather difficult to access, 
which means that in some cases I needed to rely on analyses conducted by others. 
Implications for this research are that in case where I used primary documents, I might not 
have captured the whole picture due to missing documents. In this case, I have however tried 
to complement this by reading secondary literature on the topic.  
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3. Theoretical framework 
 
Moravcsik mainly developed his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism (hereafter: LI) in his 
1998 book ‘The Choice for Europe: From Messina to Maastricht’. He argues that a tripartite 
explanation – economic interest, relative power and credible commitments – ‘accounts for the 
form, substance and timing of major steps toward European integration’ (Introduction, p.7).1 
Yet, in developing is framework Moravcsik focuses on economic integration; one could thus 
question to what extent his theory is applicable to the topic of this research. Although EU 
immigration and asylum policy making is certainly characterized by economic elements, it 
encompasses a much broader policy field which is politically very sensitive and deals with 
issues having significant societal implications. Moravcsik however argues that LI is 
‘generalizable to any international negotiation’ (Introduction, p.21), which could probably 
serve as a sufficient justification for using his theory. However, use will also be made of the 
ideas of Kraft-Kasack and Shisheva (2008) who explore how LI could be used for explaining 
the communitarization of immigration and asylum policy. As will be outlined below, this will 
sometimes mean taking the freedom to slightly extend Moravcsik’s economically oriented 
framework.  
 
The main question Moravcsik addresses is how European integration should be understood; in 
trying to discover what is generalizable about the history of European integration, he connects 
‘a liberal theory of state preferences and a neoliberal theory of international interdependence 
and institutions to earlier – predominantly ‘realist’ – approaches’ (Schimmelfennig 2014, p.2). 
Moravcsik argues – in contrast to the claims of neofunctionalism, assuming that European 
integration has mainly been driven by technocratic processes which reflect ‘imperatives of 
modern economic planning’, unintended consequences of decisions that were previously 
taken and the prominent entrepreneurial role of supranational experts – that the integration 
process reflects the political will of national leaders who are the key actors in the process. In 
particular, ‘European integration exemplifies a distinctly modern form of power politics, 
peacefully pursued by democratic states for largely economic reasons through the exploitation 
of asymmetrical interdependence and the manipulation of institutional commitments’ 
(Introduction, p.9). Integration is a process which is to be understood as ‘a series of rational 
choices made by national leaders’ who are responding to international interdependence 
(Introduction, p.10). Governments ‘define a series of underlying objectives or preferences, 
bargain to substantive agreements concerning cooperation, and finally select appropriate 
institutions in which to embed them’ (ibid.). In explaining the choices of states regarding the 
coordination of policies by means of international institutions, Moravcsik aims to explain 
these three processes, employing a different theory for each.  
 
National preference formation 
In contrast with the perception that economic integration has primarily been pursued in order 
to counter geopolitical threats and to accomplish geopolitical goals, Moravcsik argues that 
rather than geopolitical concerns being the national priority, a hierarchy of interests is absent: 
national interests rather tend to reflect ‘direct, issue-specific consequences’ (Introduction, p. 
12). National preferences concerning monetary policy and international trade are to be 
                                                          
1 For this research, the e-book version of ‘The Choice for Europe: From Messina to Maastricht’ is used. The 
cited page numbers do not correspond to the page numbers of the printed version. 
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understood in relation to the economic incentives that are generated by international economic 
interdependence; government motivations in Moravcsik’s case studies reflected pressures 
regarding the coordination of policy responses to growing opportunities for beneficial 
economic exchange. The main role of economic interest does not mean that geopolitical ideas 
are irrelevant, but pressure from economic interest groups imposed more severe limits on 
policy than security concerns and ideologies of politicians and public opinion. Generally, 
national politicians considered geopolitical goals only in case economic interests were weak, 
diffuse or uncertain.  
Moravcsik assumes that the key actors in international politics are composed of 
individuals and private groups who are, generally, rational and risk-averse. These actors try to 
promote different interests, facing the limits of ‘material scarcity, conflicting values, and 
variations in societal influence’ (Moravcsik 1997, p.516). The state is regarded as a 
representative institution which translates the preferences and power of societal actors into 
state policy (ibid.: 518), since the government is captured and constructed by domestic actors 
and because its main interest is to maintain itself in office (Moravcsik 1993). Notably, the 
state is the main instrument domestic actors can use in their attempts to exert influence on 
international negotiations.  
 In explaining the determination of national preferences, Moravcsik uses a political 
economic approach – focusing on both the efficiency and distributional consequences of 
coordinating policies. Firstly, regarding the economical aspect, cooperation is pursued by 
governments in order to ‘restructure the pattern of economic policy externalities – the pattern 
of unintended consequences of national economic activities on foreign countries – to their 
mutual benefit’ (Moravcsik 1998: Theorizing European Integration, p.38). In cases where 
markets cause preferred policies to be incompatible or allow a unilateral policy to be adjusted 
without (significant) costs in order to achieve a desired goal, cooperation is not likely to 
occur. Incentives for cooperation do however exist where negative policy externalities can be 
eliminated by working together or positive externalities can be created more efficiently than if 
action is unilaterally taken. Secondly, economic policy coordination creates winners and 
losers. Groups likely to face high costs or benefits regarding a certain policy issue will try to 
considerably pressurize their government. Yet, in cases where costs and benefits are not 
concentrated on a particular group, the issue will be less salient and organization more 
difficult – the ‘affected’ ones will thus enjoy less political power. With regard to economic 
policy, the most important among the ‘winners and losers’ are considered to be producers, 
which leads Moravcsik to focus on producer positions and their influence on policy outcomes.  
 As mentioned before, immigration and asylum policy encompasses more aspects than 
principally economic ones. Givens and Luedtke (2004) and Kraft-Kasack and Shisheva 
(2008) conclude as well that a focus on producers does not suffice. Concerning immigration, 
they argue that benefits are concentrated and costs are diffuse; this would lead the groups that 
‘benefit’ to mobilize – among them, Kraft-Kasack and Shisheva (2008) identify groups of 
employers, ethnic groups and civil rights advocates. (Although the latter do not necessarily 
‘benefit’ from immigration, they will naturally advocate for more expansive policies like the 
other two groups will likely do). The groups relatively less affected are mentioned to be the 
trade unions and ‘nationalist groups’ – both would generally favor more restrictionist policies. 
According to Moravcsik’s theory, the groups affected most would exert more pressure on the 
government, which would then lead to an expansive immigration policy. This is however not 
the case in reality: employers will for instance lobby less for pro-immigration policies during 
recessions. Moreover, expansive policies in Europe are certainly not the rule. Here, it is 
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important to consider the reference of Kraft-Kasack and Shisheva (2008) to the work of 
Givens and Luedtke (2005), who conclude that restrictionist positions of European 
governments regarding immigration and asylum are mainly a response to the restrictionist 
opinion of the domestic public. In their 2004 article – in which they build on the theory of 
intergovernmentalism – Givens and Luedtke already argue that ‘client politics’ can be 
superseded if political salience is high and large electorates mobilize against particular aspects 
of immigration policy harmonization. In sum, they argue that when salience is low, client 
politics and pro-migrant institutions can play a role, but when it is high, electoral 
considerations take over. As assumed by Moravcsik (1993), the main interest of the 
government is to stay in power, so it seems justifiable to recognize the influence of public 
pressure on policy outcomes as well.  
   
Outcomes of interstate bargaining 
The second question is concerned with explaining the outcomes of interstate bargaining;  
Moravcsik uses bargaining theory and focuses on efficiency (whether the outcome is Pareto-
efficient) and the distribution of gains from cooperation among Member States. He finds that 
in general, EC bargaining is Pareto-efficient, yet there is considerable variation regarding its 
distributive outcomes. These divergent levels of influence in policy making processes have 
been explained in different ways; neofunctionalism e.g. holds that supranational officials 
influence interstate bargaining most – they would play a significant role in overcoming high 
transaction costs associated with interstate bargaining which would prevent efficient 
intergovernmental negotiation. Additionally, EU institutions would have empowered a group 
of political entrepreneurs, which would have been able to steer the outcomes of the process in 
the direction they themselves preferred. Stipulating the key role states play in the process (and 
arguing that efforts of supranational officials yield limited results or can even be 
counterproductive), Moravcsik however argues that bargaining outcomes are shaped by the 
relative bargaining power of states. Governments that would obtain high benefits by the 
conclusion of an agreement – these benefits being relative to the best unilateral and coalitional 
alternatives – generally offer larger compromises in order to come to this agreement. 
Regarding the bargaining process: negotiating generally happens in an ‘issue-specific’ way, 
cross-issue linkages are limited to ‘balancing out benefits among governments’ and mostly 
happen by means of institutional concessions or cash payments (Moravcsik 1998: 
Introduction, p.16). So, instead of the outcomes reflecting preferences of supranational actors, 
they reflect the ‘pattern of asymmetrical interdependence among policy preferences’ (ibid. 
p.17).  
 
Choices for supranational institutions 
Lastly, in trying to find an explanation for the decisions of states regarding the construction of 
European institutions and the choice to transfer sovereignty to them, Moravcsik employs a 
functional theory (Schimmelfennig 2004, p.78 in Kraft-Kasack and Shisheva 2008). 
Principally, the choice is about either delegating (granting decision-making powers) or 
pooling (introducing qualified majority voting) sovereignty. Different theories suggest three 
main reasons for pooling and delegating sovereignty to supranational institutions. A first 
explanation refers to the role of European federalism, favoring EU institutions because of 
ideological considerations. A second, neofunctionalist, explanation holds that international 
institutions (with centralized technocratic departments) are more efficient regarding producing 
and processing information than decentralized governments. According to Moravcsik, choices 
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of states to pool or delegate sovereignty should rather be understood as efforts aimed at 
constraining and controlling other governments – i.e. in order to raise the credibility of 
commitments. Transfer of sovereignty would happen when potential joint gains are 
significant, but where efforts to assure compliance by other governments through domestic or 
decentralized means are probably ineffective, and where there is a significant chance that 
governments will ‘defect’. Pooling and delegation are favored if the efficiency of common 
decisions is considered more important than retaining the right to veto legislation. In short: 
“delegation and pooling are most likely to arise in issue-areas where joint gains are high and 
distributional conflicts are moderate, and where there is uncertainty about future decisions” 
(Moravcsik 1998: 1. Theorizing European Integration p. 126).  
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4. EU asylum and immigration policy: towards harmonization? 
 
Before the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, EU law did not contain any reference to asylum, 
immigration or – even more generally – human rights. It was with the creation of the internal 
market, which entailed shifting the focus of border controls from internal to external borders, 
that decision-making regarding admission of third-country nationals became an ‘area of 
common concern’ (Battjes 2006). The way in which this common concern has subsequently 
been addressed will be the focus of this chapter, which deals with the (macro-)developments 
regarding the communitarization of immigration and asylum policy. First, cooperation before 
its institutionalization will briefly be discussed, concerning the period before the 1999 
Tampere Council during which Member States committed themselves to the creation of a 
common immigration and asylum policy. Discussing early policy cooperation is important, 
since it allows for a better understanding of more recent policy and policy-making dynamics – 
many of the bases of the legal measures created by intergovernmental decision-making and 
prevailing perceptions during this period are still reflected in current EU policy. The two 
following sections will deal with the two main phases (1999-2004 and 2005-2014) of the 
development of the common immigration and asylum policy. 
 
4.1 Early cooperation: pre-Tampere 
 
Initially, EC Members took different positions regarding the elimination of internal borders; 
consequently, border controls and immigration were for a long time dealt with outside the 
framework of EC law. Members willing to abolish internal borders concluded the Schengen 
Agreement in 1985, which eventually formed the Schengen acquis together with the 
Schengen Implementation Agreements and a number of related measures. Although the 
Schengen Implementation Agreement contained provisions on immigration, these were 
revised with the conclusion of the Dublin Convention (hereafter: Dublin I) in 1990, being the 
result of the efforts of the ‘European Political Cooperation’ by the Council of the Ministers 
for Immigration of the EEC. Dublin I contained binding provisions and established a system 
to determine which State would be responsible for the examination of an asylum application 
lodged in a Member State; in this way, Members tried to combat ‘asylum shopping’. Rules on 
procedures regarding the examination and the reception of asylum-seekers were however left 
to domestic law. Dublin I was adopted by all Members; the UK and Ireland acceded as well, 
while the positions of Iceland and Norway were covered in another treaty. Following Dublin 
I, the European Political Cooperation issued inter alia the four so-called ‘London Resolutions’ 
dealing with asylum, but these were not binding (Battjes 2006).  
With the creation of the EU by means of the Treaty of Maastricht immigration matters 
gradually entered the field of Community law. The EU was established as consisting of three 
pillars: the EC, ‘security and foreign policy’, and ‘justice and home affairs’. The aim of the 
last pillar was to achieve the free movement of persons, and in this context it was declared 
that asylum and immigration were ‘matters of common interest’ on which measures could be 
adopted by means of unanimity voting. Furthermore, the Treaty outlined that when dealing 
with asylum issues, signatories should comply with the European Convention of Human 
Rights of 1950 and the Geneva Convention of 1951 (Vellutti 2014). Yet, the Treaty has been 
criticized for its lacking democratic and judicial review, and lengthy procedures and 
unanimity voting made decision-making ineffective (Battjes 2006). The institutional 
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arrangements ensured that Member States continued to be the most influential actors: the 
Council was just required to ‘engage’ the Commission regarding its efforts in the field of 
asylum policy and the Parliament should only be ‘informed’ about the initiatives. 
Furthermore, the European Court of Justice did not enjoy jurisdiction in the field of asylum 
measures (Vellutti 2014). This led to the fact that the scope and number of adopted measures 
were limited, and, as Kaunert and Léonard (2012a, p.8) argue, ‘in line with preferences of the 
dominant actors’, the Ministers of Interior. Adopted measures could generally be labelled 
‘soft law’, and, consequently, had very limited effect.  
The efforts of the Member States to collaborate out of the scope of EC law turned out 
to be unsatisfactory; mainly the wide divergences among the asylum policies of Member 
States led to the fact that asylum shopping continued (Battjes 2006). The fact that some 
Member States particularly in Western Europe received disproportionate numbers of asylum- 
seekers led to a call for common action and more specifically ‘centrally determined burden 
sharing’ (Moraes 2003). In line with Moravcsik’s assumption regarding which groups would 
favor cooperation, it were indeed typically the countries experience the highest pressure – 
among them Germany and Austria – that called for common action, admitting that they could 
not unilaterally deal with the situation (ibid.). Regarding domestic actors influencing 
governmental action, Moraes (2003, p.119) points out that the high pressure of the European 
public has been ‘a key driver for a common policy’, calling for solutions – either at the 
national or the international level – to the problems experienced with asylum-seekers and 
illegal immigrants appearing repeatedly in the news. An example is the media coverage on the 
dangerous migration sea routes to Italy, claiming the lives of a lot of people. Whether the 
public sympathized with the migrants or opposed their entry to the EU, it started to recognize 
that current bilateral and intergovernmental agreements were insufficient, and that better 
solutions could probably be found by means of undertaking EU-wide action. Although public 
pressure has initially largely prompted states to look for cooperation, public fear of more EU 
involvement has sometimes also impeded further progress in the policy field of immigration 
(ibid.) – both developments will be discussed in the subsequent sections on formalized 
cooperation.  
 
4.2 The first phase of policy-making: 1999-2004 
 
4.2.1 Enhanced supranational powers and Council commitment 
 
The first phase of formal cooperation took place in the context of the entering into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. Increased interdependence due to enhanced border permeability, 
anticipated externalities associated with the entry into force of the Schengen agreement and 
negative public attitudes towards immigration led Member States to decide to move the policy 
field of immigration and asylum from the third to the first pillar of the EU legal framework 
(Moraes 2003; Velluti 2014), constituting ‘clear evidence of a commitment to a more active 
policy’ (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1999, p.72). In practice, this meant that the Commission 
was granted the competence to draft policy proposals, although during the first five years it 
would have to share this right with the Member States – after this period it would enjoy the 
sole right of initiative. In addition, during this transition period the Council would make 
decisions unanimously after consulting the Parliament; after these five years co-decision 
making and qualified majority voting would be put in place. (Velluti 2014). Significantly, the 
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Treaty required the Member States to adopt a number of measures on immigration and asylum 
within the transitional period of five years after its coming into force (ibid.). 
It has been argued that the obligations outlined in the Amsterdam Treaty could have 
been easily fulfilled by the adoption or re-adoption of drafted or existing measures, as was 
suggested by the Austrian Presidency in its 1998 Strategy Paper on the topic. Yet, during the 
Tampere Council of 1999 Member States expressed more ambitious aims (Battjes 2006) – in 
the literature, this has often been identified as the point in time at which clear commitment to 
cooperation was expressed. The Council Conclusions read: “The separate but closely related 
issues of asylum and migration call for the development of a common EU policy (…)” 
(European Council, 1999). Yet, since unanimous decision making was still in place, the goals 
to be set should be broad but ambitious, which would promote the development of policy 
measures needed to achieve those goals – avoiding areas of sovereignty that were too 
sensitive (Collett 2014). Eventually, the Conclusions have profoundly influenced and shaped 
in particular European asylum law because rather than approaching asylum policy as a 
‘flanking measure’ to the creation of an area of free movement for EU citizens, it was defined 
as an independent objective (Battjes 2006).  
 
4.2.2 National preference formation 
 
While at the EU level a clear commitment was made to develop a common policy, national 
leaders continued to face significant criticism from the domestic public. Several factors can be 
attributed to the high level of political salience of asylum and immigration. First of all, illegal 
migrants were increasingly being accused by right-wing parties and the media for abusing 
social security and asylum systems – fuelling outrage among the European public. At the 
same time humanitarian tragedies gained major attention: in 2000, 58 illegal immigrants were 
found death in a lorry at Dover, which contributed as well to the call for effective policies on 
illegal immigration. In addition, border countries in Southern Europe were still facing 
significant migrant inflows and frequent humanitarian catastrophes in the Mediterranean sea – 
all this led to increasing public pressure to agree on common policies to discourage migrants 
and, for Southern countries specifically, to develop a burden-sharing system (Post and 
Niemann 2007).  
 The immigration debate became even more salient after the September 11 attacks. 
Security became the key priority for Member States, and measures and public discourse were 
directed to stricter border controls and immigration regulations – in fact, the attacks led to the 
fact that internal security and immigration were increasingly connected (Lavenex 2006). In 
various countries discussions on illegal immigration, terrorism and Islamist fundamentalism 
and the inadequate policies of government in addressing these problems helped rightwing 
parties (e.g. Le Pen’s Front National) to gain considerable public support. This made them in 
turn able to put pressures on their governments to take stricter measures at both national and 
EU levels (Lavenex 2006; Post and Niemann 2007). The consequent ‘securitization of 
immigration’ has however been explained differently by scholars. Related to the positions of 
right-wing parties outlined above, some have argued that securitization already existed before 
September 11; the attacks would just have been a pretext for the implementation of policies 
that were politically unfeasible before (e.g. Boswell; 2006 Karyotis 2007). On the other side, 
scholars from in particular the US have often pointed to existing threats of immigration with 
regard to terrorism; Leiken (2004; 2005) argues for example that the source of terrorism in the 
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Western world was constituted by the first and second generation of immigrants. This points 
thus to a real perception of threat underlying policy preferences for stricter regulations.  
At least, it has been argued by several authors (see e.g. Givens and Luedtke 2004; 
Lavenex 2006; Schain 2009) that EU member states have practiced ‘venue-shopping’ in the 
field of immigration and asylum policy making – i.e., national representatives have been 
experiencing constraints regarding the implementation of a more restrictive domestic 
immigration policy due to conflicting opinions of other political actors, non-govenmental 
organizations (Lavenex 2000), and more generally, ‘embedded liberalism’ in political and 
legal systems (Schain 2009), which led them to choose the ‘European venue’ in order to 
evade these obstacles. In this way, they enjoyed an ‘information advantage’ over the domestic 
actors and were able to act as gatekeepers. Lavenex (2006) argues that the resulting 
‘intergovernmental cooperation networks’ consisted of national representatives working for 
the same ministries; this would generally lead to policy preferences favouring a specific 
policy (direction). Moreover, working groups responsible for the preparations of the Council 
mainly consisted of staff from Ministries of Interior – foreign affairs ministries 
representatives were often absent. Working group outcomes thus principally reflected 
‘Interior’ concerns and preferences, which were mainly related to restriction of immigration 
and securitization (Schain, 2009).  
From this perspective, international cooperation would thus have been pursued in 
order to advance domestic policy agenda’s rather than to create a common policy (Lavenex 
2006). While EU cooperation has often been associated with a loss of autonomy and a transfer 
of sovereignty, the contrary – enhanced autonomy for governments by creating another 
political arena (Wolf 1999 in Lavenex, 2006) – would thus have occurred in this case. 
Although this perspective seems to grant certain governmental sections more power than 
others, this does not necessarily contradict Moravcsik’s assumptions: aiming to stay in power, 
domestic pressures will still be relevant for political actors when choosing particular policies. 
Additionally, although the creation of a common policy – which would according to 
Moravcsik be pursued because it would be more effective and efficient than national 
alternatives – would thus not be the principal aim, it still points to a central role for states, 
which use supranational institutions to achieve domestic goals. The research of Givens and 
Luedtke (2004; 2005) also provide support for this idea: examining Commission proposals 
during the Tampere Programme, the scholars conclude that countries with strong national 
institutions protecting immigrant rights are more likely to prefer (restrictive) harmonization – 
in this way, it is possible for them to evade domestic institutional constraints.  
  
4.2.3 Bargaining outcomes 
 
The Commission review of the Tampere Programme reads that significant successes have 
been achieved, but that ‘the original ambition was limited by institutional constraints, and 
sometimes also by a lack of sufficient political consensus’ (European Commission 2004c p.5 
in Lavenex 2006, p.337). Notably, in practice there were wide divergences between the 
ambitions of the EU institutions and the Member States from the start. Mainly the Parliament 
but the Commission as well advocated for harmonization and a comprehensive rights-based 
approach. Their liberal positioning could be attributed to the fat that they do not experience 
the direct electoral pressure the way national representatives do – less political pressure thus 
leads to different ‘cost-benefit calculations’ regarding policies to be pursued (Luedtke 2009). 
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Member States however favored a more limited approach and focused on security and 
restrictions and insisted on maintaining discretion. The fact that the Parliament only needed to 
be consulted, enabled the Member States to largely neglect it ‘as an actor’ (Kaunert 2010). 
The former, who positioned itself mainly as a ‘pro-migrant’ actor, tried to form an alliance 
with the Commission, being frustrated by its lack of influence (Servent and Trauner 2014). 
Yet, the fact that the Commission still had to share the right of initiative and the use of the 
unanimity decision making procedure led the Commission to often align with the wishes of 
governments (Lavenex 2001 in Servent and Trauner 2014). This is also reflected in the 
outcomes of the Tampere Programme: most measures concern combating illegal immigration 
and addressing the abuse of asylum systems (Lavenex 2006).  
 
Immigration 
Regarding the common immigration policy action plans have been adopted in the field of 
fighting illegal migration, control of external border and lastly, return policy. Regarding this 
three action plans, legislative measures were yet to be created. Probably the most significant 
concrete action has been the agreement on the establishment of the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union (known as Frontex) on 26 October 2004 (Pratt, 2004). Frontex has been 
established as an EU agency tasked with the promotion, coordination and development of 
European border management, helping border authorities from different Member States to 
cooperate (Frontex 2015).  
Achievements in the field of legal migration have been more difficult to observe. Yet, 
some directives have been adopted, among which two Directives on the admission of students 
and researchers of third countries. These issues were however not characterized by high 
salience or sensitivity, so, they did not involve difficult negotiation processes (Lambert 2006). 
More important and contested Directives are the following: 
1. Directive Concerning the Status of Third-Country Nationals who are Long-term Residents 
(Council Directive 2003/109/EC): this Directive regulates the entry, stay, status and rights in 
areas such as education, access to employment and social security provisions of long-term 
immigrants. Although the initial proposal included that the Directive should be binding, the 
final outcome does not include ‘hard obligations’.  Rather, the Directive contains weak 
language – an important example being the provisions regarding equal treatment of 
immigrants in which the word ‘may’ is used instead of the more binding ‘shall’. In sum, the 
Directive enabled national governments with generous national policies to adopt more 
restrictive policies, while countries with already restrictive systems in place managed to 
weaken the initially proposed text successfully (Servent and Trauner 2014).  
2. Family Reunification Directive (Council Directive 2003/86/EC): although Lambert (2006) 
claims that this Directive has been characterized by a low level of salience, Luedtke (2009) 
has argued that because other channels of legal migration are in general closed, family 
reunification constitutes the key category of immigration to the EU. Consequently, it has thus 
taken a primary place during attempts to create common EU policies. Yet, this does not mean 
that the issue enjoyed high public salience as well. Again, the initial proposals were much 
more liberal than the eventual policy outcomes. However, it has to be noted that the 
Commission was able to defend some aspects that were more liberal than in many national 
legal systems – indicating a small victory for EU institutions (ibid.).  
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Asylum 
Progress has been most clear regarding the establishment of a ‘Common European Asylum 
System’. Yet, asylum measures generally only contain references to minimum standards to be 
adopted, showing that Members still maintain notable discretion (Battjes 2006). Feelings of 
suspicion towards people applying for asylum have moreover led to proposals of controversial 
measures, an example being restricting the movement of asylum-seekers to specific areas, 
which would legitimize detaining asylum-seekers during the period in which their application 
was examined or while they were waiting to be transferred to the Member State responsible 
for dealing with the asylum application (Servent and Trauner 2014). Eventually, the following 
legal instruments have been adopted: 
1. The Temporary Protection Directive (Council Directive 2001/55/EC): establishes 
‘minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of 
displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin and 
to promote a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the 
consequences of receiving such persons’. The Council should decide by qualified majority 
voting whether a so-called ‘mass influx of displaced persons’ exists. This decision is binding, 
but the member states still enjoy considerable discretion – there is no obligation regarding the 
number of people that should be admitted, since member states themselves should indicate 
their reception capacity (Servent and Trauner 2014). This seems to undermine the goal of 
‘promoting a balance of effort’, as it is not probably this will happen naturally. 
2. The Reception Conditions Directive (Council Directive 2003/9/EC): establishes minimum 
standards concerning different aspects related to the reception of asylum-seekers in Member 
States, among which are material reception conditions, residence, freedom of movement, 
health care, education and vocational training. Harmonizing reception conditions should 
combat movements of asylum seekers looking for more favorable conditions in other EU 
countries due to the variety of reception policies. Although the Directive comprises many 
different aspects, it has been argued that the standards set are generally low. The Directive 
allows States to adopt more favorable standards, but it is of course questionable to what extent 
it is likely that this will happen voluntarily. 
3. The Dublin II Regulation (Council Regulation No 343/2003): together with the Procedures 
Directive which will be discussed below, this Regulation most clearly reflects the reluctance 
of Member States to harmonization. The main principles of Dublin I, characterized by 
responsibility-shifting rather than –sharing, are largely maintained. Replacing the 1990 
Dublin Regulation, the objective was to promote more rapid processing of asylum claims 
(note 4), but above all, to counter ‘asylum shopping’ and the phenomenon of ‘asylum-seekers 
in orbit’, referring to situations in which a state transfers individuals to another state, and no 
Member State is eventually willing to take the responsibility for the examination of the claim. 
The Regulation stipulates the need to ‘strike a balance between responsibility criteria in a 
spirit of solidarity’ (note 8); yet, the ‘State of First Arrival’ rule leads to the fact that these 
‘states of first arrival’ still have to deal with the majority of the claims (Mallia 2011). Another 
controversial element has been the right of Members to send asylum-seekers to a so-called 
‘safe third country’ in which – it is argued - they could have lodged an application instead of 
entering the EU (Art. 3). The implementation of Dublin II has been facilitated by the so-called 
Eurodac system, establishing a database of fingerprints to identify asylum-seekers and illegal 
immigrants. 
4. The Asylum Qualification Directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC): lays down ‘minimum 
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standards for the qualification of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted’. It has been argued that from an international law perspective, the Directive is the 
key instrument in the newly established European asylum system because it touches the core 
of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees: it adopts the very same definition 
of ‘refugee’ and the principle of ‘non refoulement’ as enshrined in this Convention. 
International human rights law has over time also included other persons than refugees in 
need of protection as ‘beneficiaries’ of protection, and the Qualification Directive also 
encompasses a definition of persons entitled to ‘subsidiary protection’ (Lambert 2006). 
However, some (e.g. Balzacq and Carrera 2005) point to the fact that refugees and people 
granted subsidiary protection do not receive the same treatment – rights of people under 
subsidiary protection are lower than the rights of refugees, which has been fiercely opposed 
by the Parliament (Servent and Trauner 2014)  
5. The Asylum Procedures Directive (Council Directive 2005/85/EC): establishes ‘several 
minimum procedural standards, regarding issues such as access to the asylum procedure, the 
right to remain in the Member State pending the examination of the application, guarantees 
and obligations for asylum-seekers, personal interviews, legal assistance and representation, 
detention, and appeals’. Furthermore, the Directive codifies concepts like ‘safe country of 
origin’ and ‘safe third country’. As mentioned above, during the negotiations member states 
insisted on high levels of discretion. Divergences in opinions led to the fact that the adoption 
of the Directive was postponed for almost one year (Lavenex 2006). Differences between the 
Council and the Commission were mainly evident before 11 September, when the latter tabled 
relatively liberal proposals. Yet, after the attacks it took a more restrictive position e.g. 
regarding access to the asylum examination stage. Their attempts to promote harmonization 
by proposing the establishment of a single authority tasked with the examination of asylum 
claims were however in vain – Members were particularly reluctant to adopt common 
standards (Servent and Trauner 2014).  
 
4.3 The second phase of policy-making: 2005-2014 
 
4.3.1. A new institutional context: enhanced supranational competences 
 
After the Tampere Programme in which the first steps were made for the establishment of a 
common immigration and asylum policy, the The Hague Programme was adopted in 2004, 
replacing  the institutional framework of the Amsterdam Treaty for EU immigration and 
asylum policy making. Changes comprised granting ‘the sole right of initiative’ to the 
Commission, the introduction of the qualified majority voting procedure and co-decision 
power for the Parliament. These institutional changes applied to all policy areas except for 
legal migration. It has been argued that regarding the role the EU should have, excluding 
unwanted immigrants would be less controversial than the coordination of inclusion of legal 
immigrants (Lopatin 2013). It was however with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009 that all elements of immigration policy became subjected to co-decision and QMV 
procedures, and that the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice has been extended to all 
immigration and asylum matters (Kaunert and Léonard 2012a). Lopatin (2013) argues that the 
Commission and Parliament have gained increased authority because Members believed that 
by shifting power to common institutions, their agendas could best be served; a common 
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policy would be more effective than separate domestic policies. More specifically, 
Moravcsik’s assumption that states choose for pooling or delegation because they aim to 
enhance the credibility of commitments could certainly hold here, since wide divergences 
regarding the implementation of the first generation of immigration and asylum policies 
existed among Member States.  
 
4.3.2 National preference formation 
 
After the first generation of immigration and asylum legislation, Member States experienced a 
‘fatigue’: only few governments had a (relatively) comprehensive immigration system in 
place before the development of EU policies, and the adoption of ‘common policies’ thus 
involved considerable efforts to establish or alter national systems. While the EU policies 
adopted could in principle be easily transferrable, the development of the needed institutional 
structure in order to implement and administer policies was quite complicated. Consequently, 
the next phase of policy making focused on review and reform of existing legal measures 
rather than on creating completely new policies (Collett 2014).  
As during the first phase of policy-making, humanitarian catastrophes, the rise of 
populist parties and terrorism continued to shape political and public discourse. Yet, the 
salience of immigration issues has been significantly affected by some additional global and 
regional developments which strongly shaped domestic preferences, which again translated 
itself in decisions of states at the EU level. Firstly, the economic crisis which led to high 
levels of unemployment has obviously played a significant role. Many domestic politicians 
perceived the two goals of reducing unemployment levels and attracting economic migrants 
as fundamentally irreconcilable, or at least hard to explain to the public. Moreover, Member 
States were anyhow reluctant to further invest in new legislation due to the worsening 
economic climate. Secondly, geopolitical challenges have substantially shaped the debate. 
Obviously, the continuing flow of migrants and asylum-seekers arriving at the borders of 
Southern Europe – the conflicts in North African and Middle Eastern countries constituting a 
key source – have played a role. Numerous humanitarian catastrophes led to a heated public 
debate: since the summer of 2008 reports of migrants (trying to) reach(ing) Mediterranean EU 
countries by sea have frequently been published, and this trend has continued ever since. In 
addition, the migration flows have drawn attention to the functioning of Dublin II. The ‘State 
of First Arrival Rule’, under which the state through which a person first entered was in 
practice in the majority of the cases responsible for examining the asylum application, led to 
the fact that border countries like Malta, Greece and Italy had become  disproportionally 
burdened (Mainwaring 2012; Langford 2013). In many cases, they were not able to manage 
the large inflows of people and could not offer adequate reception conditions as prescribed by 
EU policy. Policy-makers have been pressured by domestic publics and NGOs alike to 
address the situation, either focusing on the humanitarian aspects or emphasizing the idea of 
‘burden-sharing’ theoretically present in EU law, but in practice absent.2 Among others,  
UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration have emphasized the enormous 
                                                          
2 Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, being part of the chapter on policies on 
border checks, asylum and immigration, reads as follows: “The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and 
their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including 
its financial implications, between the Member States…” 
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scale and complexity of the problem, and have called for a cooperative approach to prevent 
more losses of lives (IOM 2015; UNHCR 2015).  
 
4.3.3 Bargaining outcomes 
 
The second phase was characterized by less opposing positions of the EU institutions and the 
Council. In particular with regard to asylum, the latter became slightly more open to the idea 
of enhancing individual rights. Notably, the Parliament approached Council positions on 
controversial issues like the possibility to reduce or withdraw reception conditions, although 
in other areas it still favored more liberal measures, e.g. regarding gender issues. The 
Commission showed ambivalence and was neither particularly restrictive nor liberal. Yet in 
general, conflicting opinions continued to exist concerning the level of integration to be 
pursued.  
 
Immigration 
In line with the first phase of policy making, the main focus has been on combating illegal 
immigration. The most notable achievement has been the adoption of the so-called ‘Returns 
Directive’ in 2008, aiming at the harmonization of national laws and practices concerning the 
removal of illegal third-country nationals. Negotiations were troublesome: for the Parliament 
it was the first time to be involved as co-legislator regarding an immigration measure, and 
from the very start its position seemed to be irreconcilable with that of the Member States. 
The latter aimed to adopt common standards which could ease the work of domestic 
authorities dealing with return operations. Consequently, proposals likely to prevent or cause 
delays in the process – restrictions on detention, requirements to provide legal aid, more 
opportunities regarding challenging decisions to return – were powerfully resisted. The 
Parliament was however more concerned with the adoption of a framework in which 
fundamental rights would be respected and appropriate safeguards and procedural guarantees 
would be enshrined. The eventual outcome has been strongly criticized – in particular 
measures like a ban on re-entering EU territory and prolonged pre-removal detention have 
been controversial (Baldaccini 2009).  
 In the area of legal migration, the most significant achievement has probably been the 
adoption of the Blue Card Directive in 2009, which aims to streamline processes, establish a 
centralized are for decision-making and to provide an easy application procedure for highly 
skilled immigrants. Although EU institutions were highly in favor of the Directive, Member 
State support has been more difficult to obtain due to considerable variations in domestic 
policies, an agreement on a lowest common denominator was reached, including an opt-out of 
three Members – emphasizing the continued dominance of national preferences in EU policies 
(Cerna 2014). Additionally, the finally adopted Directive allows for significant discretion. 
The right to determine how many workers should be admitted was for example retained, 
leading to questions regarding the level of harmonization of the Directive. Additionally, the 
Directive does not address issues concerning the recognition of qualiﬁcation and skills for 
third-country nationals (Collett 2008). Member States were clearly not willing to delegate 
significant powers regarding policies concerning their labor market to EU institutions. 
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Asylum 
Although the Recast Directives are in some respects less restrictive than their forerunners and 
include new rights, these changes have been labeled ‘secondary’ as they do not change the 
core of asylum legislation (Servent and Trauner, 2014). As was the case during the first phase 
of policy making, national actors concerned with domestic affairs played a dominant role in 
the policy-making process, contributing to the fact that preferences for restrictive policies 
remained  relatively constant (Völkel 2014). In this respect the role of inter-institutional 
coalition building – which intensified after the introduction of co-decision making – has been 
significant as well. Ministers of Interior took the lead in forming an advocacy coalition with 
centre-right party groups of the Parliament, which formed a powerful opposition to the 
Commission and centre-left Parliament groups. Within the Council itself, ministers of the left 
and right often issued similar proposals, which mainly focused on administrative costs and 
accommodating national practices, and not so much on ideological issues – providing support 
for Moravcsik’s assumption regarding the priority of economic interests. Intra-Council 
coalition-building only happened in order to reach agreement regarding solutions for the few 
members dealing with the majority of asylum applications (Mainwaring 2012; Servent and 
Trauner 2014), which were however not able to achieve very substantial successes (Langford 
2013).  
Meanwhile, EU elections in 2009 led to a more conservative Parliament and 
established a more liberal Commissioner (Cecilia Malström), reinforcing the centre-right 
European People’s Party and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. Initially, the 
Commission continued to issue ambitious proposals aimed at harmonization and a more 
rights-based system, which found no support in the Council. Eventually, this led the 
Commissioner and the Liberal Parliamentarians to recognize the need for a ‘recast of the 
recast’. In practice, the new proposals tabled often involved the reintroduction of provisions 
the Commission had tried to delete or change before and eventually, ALDE-Parliamentarians 
had to be convinced to support these proposals (Servent and Trauner 2014).  
Various factors can account for the success of the Council and its coalition members in 
achieving their preferred outcome of relatively restrictive legislation. First of all, the fact that 
the Parliament now operated under the co-decision procedure gave it a stronger feeling 
regarding responsibility for policy outcomes, leading to more conciliatory behavior from its 
side which in turn led to voting for more restrictive positions than originally favored. 
Although the Parliament had gained more authority in the decision-making process, it 
simultaneously realized it needed to issue proposals the Council could agree on, which meant 
restricting its original positions (Lopatin 2013). Also, some Parliamentarians (the ones in 
favor of more liberal provisions) argued that after lengthy negotiations, voting against the 
proposals would ‘have made them look like a fool’. Another factor concerns the fact that the 
Council knew how to effectively frame its positions as being legitimate, referring to the 
economic climate in order to maintain more discretion and to prevent measures which would 
require the raising of the minimum level of reception conditions. In the context of strict 
austerity measures, the call for a more pragmatic Parliament seemed perceived to be 
legitimate: the Parliamentarians who wished a more restrictive approach and the ones that had 
already experience with co-decision negotiations accepted and promoted flexibility, which 
eventually led to giving up initial Parliament positions (Servent and Trauner 2014).  
 Eventualy, except for the Temporary Protection Directive, all other legal texts 
concerning asylum have been subject to a recast exercise.  
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1. The Reception Conditions Directive (Directive 2013/33/EU): relatively few changes have 
been made, the ones that were made can considered to be relatively marginal. During these 
negotiations, the Parliament showed less extreme opposition to the Council; a case in point 
concerns the possibility of detention of asylum-seekers. During the first phase of law making 
the Parliament strongly opposed this possibility, but during the recast phase it was not the 
question whether detention should be allowed at all, but topics of discussion were rather 
related to issues of length and conditions. Eventually, an agreement was reached on the 
establishment of minimum conditions in reception places, and reasons for detaining asylum-
seekers have been reduced (Servent and Trauner 2014). 
2. The Dublin III (Regulation (EU) No 604/2013): This regulation constitutes another 
example of the prevalence of the Council’s position in controversial cases. The EU 
institutions e.g. advocated for suspending transfers of asylum-seekers in cases where Member 
States could not deal with the application – being influenced by the rulings of the ECTHR and 
CJEU that a transfer back to Greece would involve a serious risk of subjection to inhuman 
treatment. Although these rulings were considered to be milestones, they did not really alter 
the system. The recast of Dublin II primarily tried to address shortcomings by establishing an 
early warning system and the provision of ad hoc support for countries unable to deal with the 
applications. Yet, no real burden-sharing measures were introduced.  
3. The Asylum Qualification Directive (Directive 2011/95/EU): this is the Directive that has 
been changed most substantially, significantly moving to a more liberal side. Member States 
could or actually had to accept more generous definitions, since in practice, these were 
sometimes already applied to individual cases. New elements include inter alia an enlarged 
family definition, the approximation of the rights of refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection with regard to family unity, access to employment and health care and better 
standards for vulnerable persons with special needs such as unaccompanied minors. 
Regarding the duration of the residence permit, the rights of beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection were enhanced: renewals of residence permits after the initial validity of one year 
must be valid for at least two years.  
4. The Asylum Procedures Directive (Directive 2013/32/EU): again, negotiations concerning 
this Directive involved the most fierce inter-institutional debates on the flexibility Members 
should enjoy, causing again significant delays during negotiations. Proposals of the 
Parliament and Commission to increase harmonization were hardly reflected in the final 
outcome. The Council however considered that the new rules were more realistic with regard 
to differences among national legal systems, and pointed to the fact that in this way 
unnecessary costs and administrative burden were avoided – they would thus be able to more 
effectively combat the abuse of asylum systems. Yet, the ambiguous definitions and 
considerable discretion as embedded in the final document raised concerns at e.g. UNHCR, 
which pointed to the difficulties the new articles entailed in terms of interpretation (ibid.).  
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5. EU immigration and asylum policy-making: 
    Positioning and influence of Germany, Malta and Slovakia 
 
Whereas the previous chapter addressed policy developments in the field of immigration from a 
macro-perspective, this chapter will focus on micro-level dynamics by scrutinizing the role of 
Member States. By taking domestic factors into account, it will be examined how national 
preferences have been shaped and how these have in turn influenced national positions at the EU 
level. Subsequently, in an attempt to address the question how and to what extent national 
preferences have shaped the final outcome, the chapter will scrutinize to what extent the wishes 
expressed by the Member States are reflected in the final document. 
 
5.1 The Returns Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC) 
 
The Returns Directive has by many human rights organizations and third countries been regarded 
as ‘a restrictive alternative to facilitating expulsions’ (Amnesty International 2008; ECRE 2008 in 
Ripoll Servent 2011). Furthermore, the outcome surprised many since the Parliament who has 
generally been advocating a human-rights driven approach, enjoyed co-decision powers: however, 
in the case of the Returns Directive, it has not been able to create a liberal policy (Ripoll Servent 
2011). Eventually, it rather seems to have been a member-states driven process. 
 
Germany 
Since 1945, Germany has experienced increased immigration, with immigration flows becoming 
increasingly diverse over time; this led it to have the largest foreign population in Europe in 
absolute terms. The country has for long been reluctant to recognize itself as a ‘country of 
immigration’, and has long tried to prevent migration (Green 2013). Germany’s governments have 
been pursuing strict migration controls, yet, considerable numbers of illegal migrants were present 
during the time the Returns Directive was negotiated. Strict German policies have led to criticism 
from civil society organizations, who have been calling for more liberal approaches. Yet, 
politicians have argued that illegal migration should be fought by stricter law enforcement, 
justifying their positions essentially by arguing that all people have to comply with the law - 
illegal immigrants should not be given a residence status because otherwise, illegal migration 
would increase. German politicians raised similar arguments at the European level. Yet 
simultaneously, at the state level the humanitarian situation of the immigrants was also discussed 
(Clandestino Research Project 2008). Germany thus showed thus a mixed picture, while focusing 
on stricter controls, the government considered the unsatisfying humanitarian conditions of illegal 
migrants and faced criticisms from non-governmental organizations, yet, public salience was not 
necessarily high. Eventually, in the context of the negotiations on the Returns Directive, it turned 
out that it preferred to solve the issues domestically, which lead to considerable efforts to dilute 
the agreement – its proposals stalled the negotiations (Ripoll Servent 2011). Using its Presidency 
position, Germany issued a proposal which removed many provisions of the Directive and 
required that the remaining provisions should be left to national law. The German suggestions 
opposed extensive harmonization of all dimensions of expulsion, arguing that only in some areas 
like temporary custody, legal remedies, re-entry and residence bans phased Community-wide 
harmonization could be possible. In fact, even provisions on these elements cannot be regarded as 
pointing to any serious level of harmonization. First, regarding return decisions and removal 
orders, Germany suggested that regarding a return decision or the application of a removal order, 
no time period should be set by EU law and EU regulations should neither specify conditions 
restricting the grounds on which removal orders could be issued. In addition, except for specific 
cases, no entitlements should exist regarding postponing of removals. Secondly, it argued that in 
case a removal order should be enforced, an EU-wide re-entry ban should be mandatory. In some 
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cases, it would be optional – however, it did not specify in which cases. Also, it did not specify 
whether bans should be limited or indefinite. Thirdly, regarding ‘remedies’, it entirely left 
decisions to international law regarding whether return decisions or removal orders would have to 
be provided in writing, whether information regarding legal remedies is provided to the people 
concerned, and the language in which the people are informed about decisions. The availability of 
legal remedies against decisions, access to legal aid, and the question whether appeals against 
removals could lead to suspension were all left to national law. Fourthly, Germany suggested that 
when it would assist executing expulsions, detention should be possible – the length of detention, 
availability of legal safeguards and review should be determined by national law; moreover, 
detention conditions should fall outside the Directive’s scope. Lastly, the proposal stated that the 
Directive should not cover the treatment of individuals (Peers 2008). 
 
Malta 
Irregular migration has been on Malta’s political agenda since 2002, when the country 
experienced the arrival of 1686 illegal migrants, which constituted a significant increase 
considering that in 2001 only counted 57 arrivals were counted (National Statiscs Office 2006, in 
Mainwaring, 2012). This increase of arrivals has partially been attributed to changing migration 
flows due to stronger patrols regarding the West African route leading to the Canary Islands and 
Spain. Numbers of arrivals increased every following year, with a peak in 2008 of 2775 arrivals 
(National Statistics Office, 2010:2 in Mainwaring, 2012). Although Malta’s detention policy had 
been in place prior to its accession to the EU, it has been argued that detention has been used as a 
political tool – due to lacking material (economic or military) power, framing irregular migration 
as a ‘crisis’ and reinforcing this interpretation by the detention policy, would have been used as a 
strategy to gain more power and EU support. Malta is the only EU country which detains migrants 
from the moment of arrival for 18 months (Mainwaring, 2012). Obligatory detention has been 
justified by political representatives by pointing to the characteristics of the island – the strategic 
position, size, exposed coastline and population density – which would make the country more 
vulnerable than other EU members regarding irregular migratory flows: “These characteristics not 
only reﬂect the country’s physical restrictions but result in a range of social, cultural and 
environmental challenges. [...] It is therefore in the national interest, and more speciﬁcally, for 
reasons concerning employment, accommodation and maintenance of public order, that a 
detention policy be adopted in cases concerning the arrival of irregular immigrants” (Government 
of Malta, 2005: 6 in Lemaire 2014). Notably, consensus exists across Maltese political parties 
regarding the need for detention, presenting immigration as something from which the island 
should be protected. Sub-Saharan migrants are thus identified as a threat, which in turn influences 
public opinion. In sum, criminalizing them negatively affects Maltese peoples’ perceptions 
(Lemaire 2014). Regarding the negotiations on the Returns Directive, the article on ‘Detention’ 
was thus obviously the most important point on which Malta persistently required more discretion. 
Generally, in relation to all the provisions dealing with detention, it stated that the context of the 
article should be put ‘in accordance with national legislation’.  Furthermore, it opposed the 
proposal that detention should not exceed a period of six months, arguing that Member States 
should have the freedom to determine this, since national situations and needs vary.3  
 
Slovakia 
Slovakia has been serving as a transit country rather than as a destination for migrants. The 
country has one of the lowest numbers of foreign residents in the EU; it has been estimated that in 
2008, approximately 15.000-20.000 illegal migrants resided in the country, which was 0.3-0.4% of 
the total population. Since its accession to the EU and the Schengen system, border controls have 
                                                          
3 See e.g. the following working party outcomes: Council doc 6641/08 and Council doc 7774/08. 
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been strengthened which has led to a substantial decrease in the number of illegal migrants. Due to 
the fact that the problem seems to be relatively marginal, (open) debates in the country on e.g. the 
roots and consequences of illegal migration have generally not been part of expert and political 
discussions (Clandestino Research Project 2009). The low salience of the issue is also visible with 
regard to the Returns Directive negotiations: examining (the available) Council documents and 
outcomes of working party meetings indicate that Slovakia has either often been absent during 
discussions or contributed rather little to the discussions and did not raise any shocking or 
substantial concerns. In fact, it just joined other delegations in expressing reservations. With 
regard to judicial remedies, it joined other Member in the opinion regarding the provision that 
Member States should ensure that the person concerned would have the right to ‘an effective 
judicial remedy before a court or tribunal to appeal against or seek review of a return decisions 
and/or removal order’, arguing the possibility to appeal before an administrative organ should 
suffice. Furthermore, it expressed – also among a large group of delegations – reservation on the 
provision that Member States would be obliged to provide the returnee with legal aid, considering 
that in this way, the costs associated with return would increase.4 
 
Outcomes 
Although Germany’s proposal has not led to a complete deadlock and during the subsequent 
Presidencies some progress has been made, the final version (Directive 2008/115/EC) leaves 
considerable more freedom to Members and is characterized by a more restrictive nature than was 
suggested in the original Commission proposal. Germany’s suggestion to not included a time 
period regarding taking a return decision or application of a removal order has been reflected in 
the outcome and only limited exceptions have been included regarding the postponement of 
removals (Art. 9). Regarding entry bans, the final Directive lays down that in cases where the 
person concerned has not complied with the obligation to return and where no ‘period for 
voluntary departure has been granted’ entry bans are obligatory, but shall in principle not exceed 
five years. Some cases which may form exceptions are mentioned, e.g. regarding victims of 
human trafficking (Art. 11). Regarding procedures, decisions have to be issued in writing and 
should be accompanied by information regarding available legal remedies. If so requested, 
translations of the key elements of decisions should be made available in the language of the 
person concerned (Art. 12). Access to legal aid is left to be determined by national law, and 
authorities reviewing return decisions shall have the possibility to temporarily suspend 
enforcement of these decisions (Art. 13). With regard to detention, persons may be detained in 
case ‘there is a risk of absconding’ or the person ‘avoids or hampers the preparation of return or 
the removal process’, and only mentions that detention ‘shall be as short as possible’. It allows to 
detain the migrant for six months, but if certain conditions are fulfilled, this may be extended with 
another twelve months, although Members ‘may’ not extend the detention period with more than 
twelve months (Art. 15). Regarding detention conditions, some conditions are set, like the 
possibility for third-country nationals to contact legal representatives, family and consular 
authorities; special attention should be given to vulnerable persons regarding health care and 
(inter)national and non-governmental organizations shall ‘have the possibility to visit detention 
facilities’ (Art. 16) In sum, considering the objections outlined above, the majority of Member 
States’ critiques is at least to a significant extent reflect in the final version of the Directive. 
Among the reasons for the Parliament to agree with the final version despite the fact that it 
differed significantly from its initial position on the Directive has inter alia been, according to 
Acosta (2013), ‘fear of the following French Presidency’ which was perceived to be likely to take 
a much stronger position regarding the Directive in case the Parliament had not voted in favor of 
the proposal. During discussions at the Parliament on the day before voting would take place, the 
                                                          
4 See Council document 11456/06. 
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Council’s representative – the Interior Minister of Slovenia – warned that many Members could 
barely accept the compromise and if no agreement was found, the Council would introduce even 
stricter measures. He thus advised the Parliament to refrain from passing amendments. Another 
reason mentioned relates to pressure from national governments which – considering the enhanced 
power of the Parliament – would have encouraged their Parliament Members to support their 
Council position. Acosta’s (2013) ideas at least seem to support Moravcsik’s assumptions that 
states are the key actors in the negotiation process, determining the final outcomes.  
 
5.2 Legal migration: The Blue Card Directive (DIRECTIVE 2009/50/EC)  
 
In the field of legal migration, the Blue Card Directive has been developed during the second 
phase of asylum and immigration policy-making. In the spirit of  the goal ‘to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ (Cerna 2014: 6) the 
Commission started its preparatory work. Although it was expected that the Directive would be 
easily approved, many controversial issues appeared during the negotiation process 
(Laubenthal 2014). The final outcome is perceived to be a ‘advertising tool’ rather than making 
a substantial difference in the field of labor market access regulation (Cerna 2014). 
 
Germany 
Germany was among the states that most severely opposed the Directive (Cerna 2008; 
Laubenthal, 2014). First of all, it was revising its domestic high-skilled immigration policy 
during the negotiations – traditionally having a very restrictive policy, it was now considering 
the migration of high-skilled Germans, posing challenges and calling for a revision of its 
immigration policy. Supranational involvement in this domestic process did not seem to be 
desired (Green 2013). Referring to the levels of unemployment (negotiations took place in the 
context of the economic crisis), it argued that a new policy should not put more pressure on the 
unemployed in the EU and that Member States should be able to decide for themselves how 
many immigrants they wanted to accept - the plan was simply ‘a centralization too far’(Gümüs 
2010). Notably, Germany had already established a system covering certain groups of highly 
skilled non-EU nationals and moreover, it was argued that the level of unemployment indicated 
that skills were available domestically – a supranational solution to the problem would thus not 
be needed. Although German business actors voiced concerns regarding negative consequences 
of shortage of skilled employees, the German government continued to be reluctant. Further 
concerns were raised that the Directive could contribute to a ‘brain drain’ with regard to 
developing countries - the health sector being particularly vulnerable. The general one-size-fits-
all approach was criticized too: arguing that states had different needs, Germany stated that it 
would first and foremost adhere to domestic policies (ibid.). 
Germany’s largely negative reception of the proposal translated into considerable 
efforts to water it down. One of the main points that was extensively negotiated concerned the 
way how ‘highly-qualified employment’ should be defined. The Commission advocated for the 
flexibility that regarding admission requirements, ‘higher professional qualifications’ could be 
replaced by minimal three years of professional experience, instead of just accepting higher 
education qualifications. Yet, Germany eventually suggested to remove the element of 
professional experience, fearing abuse of the provision (and in this way thus limiting access 
regarding the labor market). Secondly, a key German suggestion was to include a gross 
monthly salary that would at least be twice the average salary (rather than three times the 
minimum one) of the concerned Member State. A last key point concerned Germany’s 
opposition to the proposal to ease the admission requirements in case a Blue Card holder and 
his or her family moved to another Member State – reflecting that they were not willing to lose 
sovereignty regarding issues of domestic labor markets (Meyer 2010).  
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Malta 
Malta’s migration debate has for a long time mainly centered on the debate how to deal with 
the (illegal) immigration flows it was facing –  politicians, public officials, experts and 
journalist have framed immigration as a problem which threatened Maltese security and well-
being; this view was reproduced at grassroots levels. Migrants were either approached from a 
humanitarian perspective, or presented as endangering local labor markets. In this way, the 
discussion on the possible role migrants could play in fulfilling the demands of the labor 
market was marginalized, rather focusing on preventing illegal migration. Discussions 
regarding potential benefits third-country nationals could bring by migrating to Malta were 
pushed to the background. However, because of reducing numbers of illegal migrants arriving 
at Malta due to Italy’s agreement with Libya which led to the interception of people at sea and 
because of the funds made available by the EU in order to support Malta in coping with 
migrations, popular anxiety reduced in 2008. This led to the fact that the Maltese government 
and non-state actors started to approach labor migration in a more positive way, in which there 
was more room to discuss benefits labor migration could have. Furthermore, in particular in the 
high-skilled sectors, the medical and ITC sector faced shortages (Suban and Zammit 2011). In 
this context, Malta took a critical but not necessarily negative approach during the negotiations 
on the Blue Card Directive. Besides sharing the opinion that with regard to qualifications, the 
emphasis should be on education rather than professional experience, together with 5 other 
countries it argued that the salary threshold should be equal for all applicants and not, as the 
Commission proposed, be lower for migrants under 30 years. Lastly, which rights Blue Card 
holders should enjoy turned out to be rather controversial in general as well. Here, Malta 
argued that the proposal of allowing a Blue Card holder to apply for another job after two years 
of legal employment and for obtaining equal treatment concerning admission to highly 
qualified employment as compared to nationals was not reasonable – two years was too short 
(Meyer 2010). 
 
Slovakia 
In Slovakia, migration has only gained very limited attention in the political arena and of the 
domestic public. Electoral programs of main political parties only contain short and vague 
sections on migration policy – also with regard to the public, the topic never gained much 
attention (Kodaj and Dubová, 2013). Since its accession to the EU, the number of immigrants 
has, regardless of economic circumstances, systematically increased: in 2004,  there were 2 761  
employed migrants, in 2010 this number had risen to 18 247 (Kodaj and Dubová, 2013). 
During the period 2005-2008 when the country experienced significant economic growth which 
led to increased demands for laborers, the government did not undertake any action to promote 
labor migration. The economic crisis and the subsequent restriction of immigration policies did 
not lead to significant changes in migration patterns in the period 2008-2012. Although the 
Slovak migration policy formally states to welcome economic migrants if the labor market so 
desires and to employ more highly qualified non-nationals, tools to effectively implement this 
policy have not been adopted (Bagerová, 2013). Although salience regarding labor migration is 
low, it has been argued that simultaneously, there is widespread racism and intolerance 
regarding minorities (and migrants) in Slovak society, which also includes State authorities. 
Yet, migration has probably not gained much political and public attention since Slovakia has 
traditionally not been a land of immigrants – inter alia the language barrier, economic situation 
and strict immigration legislation have not particularly been attractive (Stevulová, 2013). Low 
issue salience has led to seemingly moderate responses of the Slovak government to the 
proposed Blue Card Directive. Like other countries which recently accessed the EU, Slovakia 
argued that at that moment, the transitional arrangements which limited the labor mobility of its 
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citizens were still in place, and it thus questioned the appropriateness of t the Directive - 
referring to the possibility that non-EU nationals could be better off with regard to labor 
opportunities than Slovak citizens (Cerna 2014). Yet, did not seem to have been among the 
states most opposing the Directive, raising moderate criticisms. First of all, with regard to the 
admission criteria it questioned how the required three years of ‘professional experience’ 
(which ‘substitute’ professional qualification) should be tested, and furthermore suggested that 
a higher number of years would be required. Secondly, regarding the salary threshold, it argued 
that instead of considering the average wage of a country, the minimum wage should be taken 
as a starting point – pointing to a preference for a broader scope of the directive (Meyer 2010).  
 
Outcome 
As has been mentioned previously, the Blue Card Directive has not made a substantial 
contribution to EU legal migration policy – analyzing the bargaining process shows that 
Member States have stripped the original Commission proposal largely from its content. With 
regard to the three countries analyzed above, the proposal of Germany to delete the option of 
‘higher professional qualifications’ has largely been included, making this decision subject to 
to national law – so increasing the discretion of Member States (also satisfying Malta’s 
demand). Furthermore, the years of professional experience needed were moved from three to 
five; the Blue Card is in this way more difficult to obtain. Regarding the salary proposal, the 
final outcome was a compromise: it should be 1.5 times the gross average salary of the country 
concerned and Member States were left with the discretion to ‘determine the volume of 
admission of third-country nationals’ (partially satisfying Malta’s proposal for equality of 
admission salaries). Furthermore, Germany has been able to achieve that admission conditions 
for a Blue Card holder have not been made easier – he or she will have to apply formally again 
when moving to another Member State. Malta’s criticism concerning the possibility to change a 
job after two years and to gain equal rights compared to nationals regarding access to highly 
qualified jobs was partially considered: the latter has been made optional for Members. In sum, 
it can thus be argued that a lot of criticisms have been reflected in the final outcome. Yet, due 
to the fact that there were wide divergences among country positions (due to different national 
policies in place, which led Members to ‘upload’ different preferences to the EU level, creating 
considerable variations among Member State positions during the bargaining process) an 
agreement beyond a minimum framework was eventually not possible. Cerna (2014, p.17) 
refers to Moravcsik (1993, p.510), who argues that ‘a lowest common denominator does not 
mean that final agreements perfectly reflect the preferences of the least forthcoming 
government – since it is generally in its interest to compromise somewhat rather than veto its 
agreement – but only the range of possible agreements is decisively constrained by its 
preferences. In line with Moravcsik’s (1993, p.492, in Cerna, 2014, p.4) expectation, highly 
diverse national policies finally led to greater costs of cooperation. As Cerna (2014) argues, one 
could question why the issue of labor migration should be delegated to the EU level, since the 
benefits of integration in this field are often not directly visible (and, it does not directly 
address negative externalities). Yet, it has been argued that delegation could be desirable in 
order to increase leverage and send a clear message to the outside world that the EU offers a 
large labor market – so, making the EU more attractive in the ‘global war for talent’ in which it 
has to compete with the inter alia Australia and the USA (ibid.).  
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5.3 Asylum: The Recast Asylum Qualification Directive (DIRECTIVE 2011/95/EU)5 
 
As previously mentioned, the Asylum Qualification Directive is regarded to be the cornerstone 
of EU asylum policy. Its recast was adopted at 13 December 2011. Like all ‘first phase asylum 
Directives’, the original Directive has been criticized for its low standards. Although some have 
applauded the recast for being more liberal, others have argued that the new rules are just a 
modest improvement, raising the question whether it is ‘putting lipstick on a pig’ (Peers 2011).  
 
Germany 
Based on its WWII experience, Germany initially established a liberal asylum policy. Yet, is 
argued that in a later stadium it would have used the ‘EU arena’ to considerably tighten its 
policy. Through the creation of the Third Pillar at Maastricht Germany obtained the possibility 
to address its national deadlock regarding amending its asylum policy: the ‘need’ to meet 
European demands enabled Germany to change its Constitution – in this way, it could 
legitimately abandon its liberal standards that caused considerable financial and political 
burdens. Notably, Maastricht had empowered the European regions, which granted the Länder 
a more important role regarding EU-decision-making; by connecting asylum policy to internal 
security and financial issues, the latter – responsible for the accommodation of asylum-seekers 
– were able to realize a more instrumental attitude concerning the integration process. Since in 
Europe, the relative distributions of asylum-seekers had changed to German benefits, the 
Länder did not want to empower European decision-makers in such a way that this could lead 
to reverse this trend, so chose to block the Amsterdam QMV proposal. Notably, this restrictive 
position became characteristic of German positions during subsequent negotiations (Hellmann 
et al. 2005); regarding the Recast Directive this still seems to be the case. The fact that in 2010, 
the country had to deal with 41.255 new claims (Dublin Transnational Project 2015) – did not 
lead to enthusiasm for more and higher demands – it would generate costs rather than benefits. 
Firstly, Germany was reluctant regarding the equalization of the rights of refugees and persons 
under subsidiary protection. Another element concerns its opposition to the adoption of a 
broader definition of ‘family’ (backed by France). Lastly, reservations were expressed 
regarding the provision that ‘Member States shall endeavor to facilitate full access (…) to 
activities as employment-related education opportunities for adults, vocational training, 
including training courses for upgrading of skills, practical workplace experience and 
counselling services afforded by employment offices (…) under equivalent conditions as 
nationals’. Among other countries, Germany expressed strong reservations, arguing that ‘it 
would offer better treatment to beneficiaries of international protection than its own nationals’. 
Malta 
Malta’s domestic preferences have been shaped by a dynamic interplay between the 
governments’ strict position on dealing with asylum-seekers – detaining them at arrival and 
framing inflows of third country nationals as a ‘crisis’ for the island (Mainwaring, 2012) – and 
increased feelings of hostility and xenophobia among the Maltese population, which initially 
actually showed sympathy regarding the plights asylum-seekers (King and Thomson 2008). 
The roots of the restrictive national policies and the subsequent public hostility can be traced 
back to the accession to the EU, which made Malta a key point of entry for people trying to 
reach Europe. Furthermore, Dublin II makes Malta responsible for practically all asylum claims 
of individuals entering the EU through Malta. During the year preceding the adoption of the 
recast, 355 asylum applications were filed in Malta (McNamara 2013). Referring to the broader 
                                                          
5 This section is based on the Council negotiating position: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/jul/eu-council-
qualifications-trilogue-position.pdf 
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inflow of migrants, the Maltese government has repeatedly - unsuccessfully - asked for EU 
support by defining itself as a small and vulnerable island (Lemaire 2014). Yet, defining itself 
in such a way has led to wider public concerns regarding the influence of ‘outsiders’ on the 
island which is predominantly Catholic and generally conservative (King and Thomson 2008); 
the highest discrimination rate regarding sub-Saharan Africa’s is reported to be in Malta 
(Council of Europe 2011a in Lemaire 2014). Although (in theory) refugees enjoy the same 
rights as nationals, one could argue that the fact that less than 3% of asylum applications filed 
in Malta leads to refugee status mirrors this reluctant approach (Lemaire 2014). Feelings of 
high pressures of ‘beneficiaries of international protection’ on the national system have also 
dominated Maltese positions during the recast negotiations. Like Germany, it opposed that 
“Member States shall ensure that activities such as employment-related education opportunities 
for adults, vocational training, including training courses for upgrading of skills and practical 
workplace experience and counseling services afforded by employment offices are offered to 
beneficiaries of international protection under equivalent conditions as nationals”. Fearing 
pressure on the national labor market, Malta proposed to replace ‘under equivalent conditions 
as nationals’ with ‘under conditions set by Member States’ – asking for greater discretion. 
Furthermore, it opposed equalizing access to health care for refugees and ‘beneficiaries of 
international protection’, which would mean that the standards for both groups would be the 
same as for nationals. Backed by Slovakia, it expressed concerns regarding the financial 
implications the provision would have. A last point of criticism concerned the provision on the 
obligation of Member States to try to ‘facilitate full access for beneficiaries of international 
protection who cannot provide documentary evidence of their qualifications to appropriate 
schemes of assessment, validation and accreditation of their prior learning’. Malta questioned 
the provisions’ general effectiveness in case applicants could not deliver any documentary 
evidence. Higher requirements in this field would arguably be problematic for the government, 
since a formal integration policy has been lacking in Malta (Pirotta et al. 2014).  
 
Slovakia 
Compared to Germany and Malta, Slovakia found itself in a completely different situation. 
While in 2004, the number of applications amounted to 11.394 (Kodaj and Dubová 2013) 
during the year preceding the adoption of the recast, only 541 applications were lodged and just 
57 people were granted refugee status (Dublin Transational Project 2015). Due to the fact that 
only a small minority of the people are finally granted asylum, asylum-seekers do not choose 
Slovakia to be the first country they enter (if their application is refused here, they cannot try in 
another EU country anymore) – Slovakia thus does not experience the burdens that can be 
imposed due to the ‘First State of Arrival Rule’. Furthermore, since its accession to the 
Schengen system border protection has been improved and in addition, the absence of large 
communities of foreigners and a less favorable economic environment compared to other 
European countries keeps asylum-seekers out of its borders. Slovakia does not have the 
established tradition of providing asylum – rather, it is a field that receives limited attention. It 
was because of the accession to the EU that the country had to change its system, and the 
European legal framework has practically determined the base for Slovak asylum policy. 
However, it has to be noticed that Slovakia typically implements the minimum standards 
required (yet, even this has contributed positively to the national system) (Hurná 2012). 
Considering that its asylum system has actually only started to develop since the EU accession 
process, one could argue that bringing its system in compliance with EU regulations was just 
among one of the conditions that needed to be fulfilled, not necessarily having a high domestic 
priority. Furthermore, the fact that in Slovakia the salience of the issue is low, it does face little 
issues concerning asylum that it has to address at the national level – let alone the supranational 
level. Because of the fact that there was little reason to conclude an agreement at all, the Slovak 
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position has focused on minimizing concrete, in particular financial implications. First of all, 
with regard to the proposal that refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection should enjoy 
the same rights and benefits, it rejected that these two groups should be ‘subject to the same 
conditions of eligibility.’ Furthermore, like Germany it was critical regarding the provision that 
‘efforts should be made in particular to address the problems which prevent beneficiaries of 
international protection from having effective access to employment-related educational 
opportunities and vocational training inter alia related to financial constraints’ – recalling 
Germany’s argument. Lastly, it joined Malta in its position on equal health care for refugees 
and beneficiaries of international protection –  expressing reservations on the need for equality 
between these groups of people and nationals.  
 
Bargaining outcomes 
Germany, Malta and Slovakia often turned out to raise similar and/or overlapping criticisms 
regarding the proposal. Eventually, none of their criticisms is really reflected in the final 
outcome: an enlarged family definition is adopted, rights of refugees and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection show approximation regarding family unity, access to health care and to 
employment. In addition, access to education opportunities related to employment and 
vocational training should be improved. Furthermore, procedures regarding the recognitions of 
professional qualifications will have to be ameliorated. One could argue that the countries have 
thus not been able to bargain effectively, or have not given up enough in order to achieve what 
they really wanted. This is difficult to determine, considering the fact that the Recast has been 
adopted at ‘first reading’ (Peers 2011): in practice, this means that informal ‘trilogues’ between 
the Council and Parliament have been organized to arrive more efficiently at compromises – 
however, this usually happens at the expense of transparency and accountability. Furthermore, 
its gives the Council’s Presidency, which has to negotiate with the Parliament, increased power 
over the process. Yet, this process is rather opaque and further interactions between Member 
States and the Presidency and Member States are practically impossible to trace (Acosta 2009). 
Since an agreement could however already be reached at first reading, one could argue that the 
level of controversy was probably at least not very high. Furthermore, it is important to 
consider that during the second phase of policy making and the accompanying institutional 
changes (enhanced competences for the Commission and Parliament), the Commission issued 
less radical proposals – the attempts of the three countries analyzed above could thus probably 
also regarded as a ‘costless’ effort to even further water down the Directive. While this case 
study has maybe not been able to accurately outline the countries’ influence, it has at least shed 
light on how domestic circumstances shape national preferences and subsequently, 
supranational bargaining positions. 
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6. AU policies and AU-EU cooperation 
 
Compared to the EU, the AU has to confront very different challenges associated with 
migration. As outlined in the introduction, African migration is a multifaceted and complex 
phenomenon with significant implications for sending countries as well as for countries of 
origin. Recognizing the importance of the issue, the AU has undertaken several attempts to 
develop a comprehensive, collective approach to the problem. Considering the fact that the 
European process of creating common policies has been troublesome and that the outcome 
leaves much room for improvement, one could imagine the challenge it has posed for the AU, 
which is an organization operating by means of an intergovernmental governance structure 
(Haastrup 2013) in which 54 highly diverse countries have to try to find consensus (Olivier 
2012). This chapter will be concerned with the policy frameworks on asylum and migration 
the AU has put in place and its partnership with the EU on the topic of migration. First, a 
general overview regarding the AU policies and their implementation in practice will be 
given. Subsequently, the chapter will connect back to EU policy and will outline its approach 
towards Africa specifically, focusing on the ‘externalization dimension’ of EU policy-making.  
Subsequently, the chapter will examine how this externalization approach is reflected in the 
AU-EU partnership – i.e. if and how the EU tries to ‘upload’ its own preferences by 
influencing AU policy and action.  
 
 
6.1 African Union policy frameworks on migration, refugees, returnees and IDP’s 
 
6.1.1 AU policy frameworks concerning refugees, returnees and IDP’s 
 
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
In 1969, the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
was concluded; it has been ratified by 45 of the 54 Member States (African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2015). The reason for its creation was related to the fact that 
solutions had to be found regarding the protection and assistance for the large number of 
people fleeing conflicts caused by struggles against colonialism and apartheid, drought and 
famine (Naldi and d’Orsi 2014). The Convention has particularly added value by broadening 
the definition of ‘refugee’ compared to other legal instruments like the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, shifting the focus to objective circumstances which lead people to flee rather than 
linking it to the person’s subjective interpretation regarding threats in his or her environment 
(Okello 2014). Furthermore, the concept of ‘non refoulement’ has been extended by including 
measures concerning e.g. rejection at the frontier. Noteworthy is also the clear 
acknowledgment of asylum, which would have led the ‘right to asylum’ to be increasingly 
 accepted by African countries. 
The ‘generosity’ of the Convention was initially reflected in practice by the adoption 
of ‘open door policies’; African states accepted large numbers of asylum-seekers (Giustiniani 
2011). Currently there are however few countries left which (try to) live up to their 
commitments, one of the main reasons being lack of resources (Naldi and d’Orsi 2014).6 As 
embedded in the EU policy framework, the Convention also includes the principle of burden-
                                                          
6 An example is Ethiopia, which despites its considerable environmental challenges practices an open-door 
policy and received almost 450.000 asylum-seekers in the period 2009-2014 (Okello, 2014). 
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sharing. Implementation has however been difficult since the majority of the countries finds 
itself in harsh socio-economic conditions (Okello 2014). Another factor leading to a mismatch 
between theory and reality, relates to the fact that no amendments have been made in the forty 
years the Convention has been in force. Provisions related to the more recent large scale 
migration from Africa to Europe are thus e.g. absent – specifically, clarification on 
responsibilities of states in North Africa related to the protection of intercepted migrants 
(often victims of  trafficking) are needed (Naldi and d’Orsi 2014). Another problem is the 
absence of a uniform process to deal with asylum applications, leaving Members in fact with 
total discretion. Although Naldi and d’Orsi (2014) argue that a system ‘like that of the EU’ is 
not in place, it should again be noted that also in the case of the EU, agreements on paper do 
certainly not guarantee compliance in practice.  
 
Kampala Convention 
The second instrument related to forced migration constitutes the 2009 the African Union 
Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the 
Kampala Convention), dealing with all phases of displacement (Giustiniani 2011) and being 
the first continental-wide legally binding agreement on this issue worldwide. The Convention 
has been developed as a response to the rise of internal conflicts in the 1980’s and 1990’s 
when number of IDP’s increased dramatically, causing instabilities in host areas and thereby 
threatening peace and security. The Convention is a significant achievement, considering that 
concerns regarding state sovereignty have long impeded the development of binding 
legislation to protect IDP’s. Some countries were considerably critical regarding the fact that 
the problem of internal displacement became increasingly internationalized and opposed the 
involvement of organizations like UNHCR. As Giustiniani (2011, p.352) argues, the 
Convention shows the recognition that if internal displacement cannot be dealt with at the 
domestic level, it can become a topic of legitimate international concern; the AU has been 
given the responsibility to support states and to protect and assist IDP’s, additionally, its the 
right to intervene if IDPs face violations of their rights is reaffirmed. Fagbayibo (2013) 
however points to the fact that ‘even the AU’s strongest element of normative 
supranationalism, the right of intervention is not without complications’.  Besides the limited 
resources, disagreements among Member States on whether an intervention should take place 
or not limit the effectiveness of the mechanism. The fact that the AU Commission, Parliament 
and Court either enjoy only limited powers or remain inoperative means that the Member 
States have no counterweight at all. This makes it at least easy for the Council members to 
remain inactive or to simply block a proposed intervention (ibid.). 
 
6.1.2 AU migration policy frameworks  
 
The African Economic Community: free movement for people 
In 1991 the African Economic Community was established, containing direct provisions 
related to migration. The Abuja Treaty establishing the Community inter alia committed 
African countries to ‘progressively bring about the free movement of persons, and to ensure 
that Community nationals enjoy the right of residence and right of establishment’. The Treaty 
establishes a period of six stages covering a period of 34 years in which integration should be 
achieved; the African Common Market is to be consolidated in the fifth stage, and the free 
movement of persons and the rights to residence and establishment should be achieved in the 
last stage. The general perception has been that free movement of people is a main element of 
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regional integration and is expected to promote trade, foster economic growth and to reduce 
poverty. The AU’s Regional Economic Communities are tasked with the promotion of free 
movement combined with intra-regional trade. The AU is responsible for coordination, 
monitoring and evaluation. However, with regard to successful implementation there are wide 
divergences between the regions so far. Generally speaking, AU action has been scarce with 
regard to promoting free movement. Furthermore, although circular migration is the most 
common migration form in sub-Sahara Africa, little initiative has been taken to address this at 
a continental level (Klavert 2011). During a recent roundtable on intra-regional migration and 
labor mobility within Africa, the need for the development of ‘a Protocol on free Movement 
of persons, the Right of Residence and the Right of establishment as provided for in Article 
43 of the 1991 Abuja Treaty’ by the AU was however recognized (AU, 2015).  
 
AU Migration Policy Framework 
The more specific African Union Migration Policy Framework for Africa was established in 
2006, being the product of various meetings of African national representatives starting 
already in the early 1990s (African Union 2006a). In 2004 a draft was issued; the intention 
was to adopt the framework the same year together with mechanism for implementation. Yet, 
the process was more troublesome than anticipated: eventually, the idea to establish an 
implementation mechanism was dropped, leaving Members with the choice which elements 
they wanted to implement. Without clear instructions for enforcement, the framework ended 
up being ‘toothless’ (Klavert 2011).  
 In order to understand difficulties concerning reaching agreement, it is important to 
recognize the central role of governments in the AU and to consider their perceptions 
influencing their position in the context of the AU. Black’s (2004) research could be 
illustrative in this regard: examining African public policy, he finds that government positions 
towards migration are generally ‘either neutral or hostile’. By conducting a study on the 
contents of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, he concludes that attitudes regarding 
migration are significantly ambivalent: often no mention is made of migration or the link 
between migration and poverty is missing. If addressed, economic migration was perceived to 
have negative consequences: it would inter alia promote crime and exacerbate rural poverty. 
Developed national policy responses consequently aim to combat migration.  
The question remains whether the result – a comprehensive document; identifying 
nine key areas for which it provides strategies for policy development for Member States and 
the REC’s labor migration, border management, irregular migration, forced displacement, the 
human rights of migrants, internal migration, migration data, migration and development and 
inter-state cooperation and partnerships – points to eventually high ambitions or rather to the 
multidimensionality of migration, enhanced by the fact that all countries are addressed. 
Additionally, the document is only labelled a ‘reference document’ and is thus not binding in 
nature, giving Members the choice which elements they want to implement, ‘corresponding to 
the specific context of their country’. As a consequence, the framework does not prioritize 
certain issues or provide resource mobilization mechanisms for the recommended action: 
these would be different in every country (African Union 2006a). Klavert (2011) furthermore 
notes the absence of evaluation mechanisms as these would be determined by Members and 
REC’s themselves. In sum, consideration of the recommendations by Member States it thus 
not guaranteed at all. Klavert (2011), finds that since political traction to adopt a more binding 
agreement was lacking, the only way in which the document would be adopted, was by 
presenting it as guidelines. 
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African Common Position on Migration and Development 
The second document constitutes the African Common Position on Migration and 
Development of 2006, which was developed for the Africa-EU Conference on Migration and 
Development to be held the same year. Although negative attitudes towards migration might 
have delayed the negotiations on the Policy framework, the African Common Position reflects 
a slightly more positive approach, by e.g. stating that labor migration can benefit both origin 
and destination countries and that migration can contribute to development rather than just 
perceiving it to be a problem. Particularly relevant for the EU and its focus on border control 
is the call to strengthen African national border management, which should inter alia be 
promoted by cooperation between national security services. The EU itself is requested to 
implement the pledges made during the Africa-EU summit held in Cairo in 2000, in which 
commitments were made regarding supporting the facilitation of freedom of movement for 
Africans in the context of the Abuja Treaty, to cooperate in fighting the push and pull factors 
of migration, to enhance cooperation regarding reciprocal migrant integration and in 
protecting their rights; and to ensure protection of the rights of migrants, emphasizing the role 
of fighting discrimination. Moreover, a very concrete example is the call of the AU for more 
easy visa procedures in order to reduce illegal and irregular migration. Furthermore, more 
flexible entry requirements concerning service providers and recognition of professional 
qualifications obtained in African training institutions were asked for, requiring a legally 
binding framework in the context of the AU-EU relationship. Lastly, the EU was urged to live 
up to its commitments in terms of supporting development and specifically, to contribute to 
reaching the MDGs (African Union 2006b).  
 
6.2 An Africa-EU ‘Partnership’?  
 
6.2.1 EU approaches towards Africa: dimensions of externalization 
 
Africa’s call for EU commitment with regard to supporting its development refers to one of 
the EU approaches to migration already identified during the 1999 Tampere Council: here, 
not only ambitions were expressed with regard to the development of a common migration 
and asylum policy, the ‘external policy dimension’ was officially embraced as well (Lavenex 
2006). In its Conclusions, the Council emphasized the need to create “a comprehensive 
approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries 
and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living 
conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and 
ensuring respect for human rights” (Council, 1999). In practice, these ideas have translated 
into the so-called ‘root cause approach’, constituting one of the two ‘externalization’ 
dimensions as identified by Mangala (2012), focusing on migration prevention by addressing 
the push factors leading people to leave their countries.  
 However, Mangala (2012) argues that the prevention approach has only gained 
marginal attention. The other dimension of externalization, the so-called ‘remote control 
approach’, characterized by a reactive nature and focus on securitization, would have 
remained dominant. In practice, these ideas translated itself into emphasis on cooperation on 
border control and on concluding readmission agreements. A significant example constitutes 
the Cotonou Agreement, concluded in 2000 with the ACP-countries (just before the start of 
EU-AU cooperation), which contains the provision for both countries to ‘accept back without 
further formalities their citizens’. Furthermore, it includes the right for the EU to send back 
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illegal migrants and asylum-seekers in case of denial of their applications. It has been argued 
that this has become ‘standard practice in EU cooperation and association agreements’ (ibid.).  
The following sections will be concerned with the question of whether and how the EU has 
tried to pursue these policies in its cooperation at the continental level with the AU – if 
European preferences (and thus the preferences of  European Member States) are reflected in 
collaboration outcomes.  
 
6.2.2 The Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment: cooperation dynamics 
 
The PMME was launched at the Lisbon Summit in 2007 in the context of the JAES. The 
negotiations regarding its conclusion were mainly dominated by the topic of funding. While 
the AU asked the EU for funding in order to realize the initiatives to be developed in the 
context of the Partnership, the EU showed reluctance, pointing to the €266 million for 
migration-related projects and bilateral grants already made available before – no funding 
would be necessary for the Partnership specifically (Klavert 2011). One could argue that this 
seemingly ‘funding dependency’ makes the establishment of an equal partnership difficult, 
and the outcomes of the summit seem to support this impression. When scrutinizing the forms 
of cooperation and the formulated objectives, the EU seems still to be in the position to put its 
own preferences forward (Mangala 2010; Hansen and Jonsson 2011). 
 Preceding the Partnership, The EC expressed that within the EU, there was a 
significant demand for migrant labor and that the EU would admit more labor migrants from 
Africa. Concrete proposals however made clear that the Commission would decide who 
would be admitted, when and where, putting emphasis on seasonal labor, temporary permits 
and circular migration. Furthermore, an unknown number of Africans would be given 
temporary work permits to works as maids, in the medical service and to work in agriculture 
during specific seasons. Simultaneously, the Commission called for improved military 
guarding at sea borders and for better security cooperation with Africa in its fight against 
illegal migration. In the eventual outcome, the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on Migration and 
Development, these preferences are reflected (Hansen and Jonsson 2011). Kunz et al. (2011) 
argue that the Declaration attempted to counter ideas outlined in the African Common 
Position, ‘that the emphasis on addressing illegal or irregular migration has been only on 
security considerations rather than on broader development frameworks and on 
mainstreaming migration in development strategies’ (African Union 2006, p.2, in Kunz et al.  
2011). Emphasis should indeed be on the word ‘attempted’: although the Declaration does 
include sections on development benefits for Africa, the dominant policy prescriptions reflect 
an EU-serving and -led agenda (Tripoli Declaration 2006 in Hansen and Jonsson 2011, p.14):  
“Africa has a duty to fully cooperate with the EU in preventing illegal immigration, 
developing return instruments, and reinforcing border controls (…), foreign direct investment 
in Africa and Africa’s integration in the global economy should be promoted [and] circular, 
temporary and seasonal migration should be facilitated”. Additionally, ‘policies to increase 
the economic benefits for the EU from migration should be enacted to facilitate the admission 
of certain categories of immigrants on a needs-based approach’ (CEC 2006, p.7-8 in Hansen 
and Jonsson 2011, p. 14). However, in order to control migration flows, the EU considers it to 
be necessary to increasingly focus on combating illegal migration – in many sectors demand 
for labor is not constant, so the EU wants to protect itself for situations in which newly 
arrived migrants are all of a sudden unemployed, which would lead to social and economic 
costs for the EU. Hansen and Jonsson (2011, p. 15) argue that the rather than aiming to 
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achieve a win-win situation with significant attention for African development, the EU 
strategy reflects how the EU ‘believes itself capable of generating a win-win dynamic 
between its own security oriented fight against illegal migration, on the one side, and its 
neoliberal fight for growth and competiveness, on the other’. So in practice, this approach 
principally serves national preferences of participating EU member states (ibid.). 
Yet, as we have seen in the case of the EU, the question always remains how words 
are translated into action. Examining progress reports regarding the activities implemented in 
the context of the Partnerships, Mangala (2012) provides a critical review. First of all, he 
mentions that a considerable number of the activities listed in the reports do not fall under the 
umbrella of the Partnership. In fact, these activities are (financially) supported by EU states 
and are considered to ‘add value’ to the Partnership. Secondly, activities related to 
consultation and information-sharing (research, conferences and workshops) constitute a 
considerable share of the reporting. A third comment relates to the fact that although the EU 
has provided €266 million to migration-related projects (which they used as a reason to refuse 
to provide further financial support), the largest share of this support has been used for 
capacity-building projects in individual African states. Notably, these projects are mainly 
connected to the fight against illegal immigration, money being allocated to collaboration 
with Libya in order to prevent illegal migration, a project in Ghana concerned with 
combatting document fraud and to the building of a multi-regional expert facility to fight 
illegal migration. In general, Mangala (2012) concludes that the largest share of Partnership 
funding has been allocated to combatting illegal migration and secondly, human trafficking. 
Fourthly, elements of the partnership relating to mobility and employment haven not been 
implemented at all – leading Mangala (2012) to ask the question why these elements have 
actually been included (possibly to give the impression that the goals of both the EU and AU 
would be served?) and whether the EU and its members really want African partners to be 
engaged in mobility and employment issues. Considering the slow progress regarding EU 
common policy making on economic migration, political will to facilitate (African) legal 
migration seems to be lacking at the Community level – preferences of EU member states to 
retain discretion in this field are thus being reflected by lacking EU commitment (while its 
rhetoric was quite promising). It is of course questionable whether in the current economic 
climate of the EU ‘creating more and better jobs for Africans’ still belongs to the priorities – 
the question is maybe rather whether this has ever been the priority of the EU or if this has 
been a way to present itself as an attractive partner in an environment where it faces 
increasing competition for African collaboration from other countries.  
In sum, while the Partnership should have led to increased African efforts in the fight 
against illegal migration and enhanced EU cooperation in the field of 
development/employment and mobility, actual outcomes are actually disappointing and if 
something, rather reflect a focus on securitization than addressing the root causes of migration 
and displacements. Moreover, in general, another factor that contributes to the fact that the 
hitherto outcomes of the Partnership are unsatisfactory – for both the AU and the EU – is 
related to the low level of AU integration, which is largely due to the wide divergences among 
Member States. This leads in turn to the fact that for the EU to approach ‘Africa as One’ is  
rather complicated: the AU policies dealing with migration and displacement are often 
ambitious and comprehensive but in practice poorly implemented. Wide divergences between 
AU members lead to the fact that there is practically no base to build on. The question is thus 
whether one could have actually expected significant results to be achieved; it is probably not 
by chance that the EU has continued to ‘collaborate’ bilaterally in parallel.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
When answering the question posed in the title of this thesis – whether with regard to 
European Union and African Union migration and asylum approaches, one should speak of 
common strategies or individual policies – it seems fair to conclude that individual strategies 
rather than common policies characterize the approaches taken by both organizations. With 
regard to the African Union it seems to be clear that ‘common policy-making’ has so far not 
produced many results in practice. Considerable divergences among countries and lacking 
capacity has led to a very challenging environment for achieving concrete and sustainable 
results. Yet, developments like the conclusion of the Kampala Convention can undoubtedly 
be called considerable achievements – however, without the necessary tools for 
implementation, it is not likely that the situation will change significantly.  
Regarding the EU, the first chapter on policy-making dynamics at the EU-level and 
the subsequent chapter which focused on the influence of individual states indeed seem to 
suggest that it are the Member States which determine policy-making at the EU level, and 
thereby also decide on the level and speed of European integration. Considering the rather 
modest level of harmonization that has been achieved by the adoption of the immigration and 
asylum policies, some general conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the limited degree of 
harmonization points indeed to reluctance on the side of Member States to transfer (too much) 
sovereignty to the EU level. Secondly, at the same time it has to be noted that besides 
reluctance to ‘give up’ sovereignty, policy-making at the EU level has on the other hand been 
used to circumvent domestic constraints regarding the possibility of implementing policies 
actually preferred by national political parties. At least this fits liberal intergovernmentalist 
assumptions to the extent that it points to a(nother) way in which Members use the EU-level 
to pursue domestic agendas. Thirdly, although the EU institutions have gained more power in 
theory, in practice the impact of these institutional changes seems to be rather modest. With 
regard to for instance the conclusion of the Returns Directive, the role of the Parliament as a 
‘human rights advocate’ seems to have been negligible. Yet, deeper analysis and more study 
is needed before a real conclusion on this can be drawn. Fourthly, the wide divergences in 
perceptions and national policies among Member States make it difficult to reach agreements, 
eventually resulting in relatively ‘weak’ legislation. As has been pointed out by Moravcsik, 
the larger the divergences, the higher the costs of cooperation. Furthermore, since 
immigration and asylum are generally politically sensitive topics, there is more at stake than 
just ‘economic benefits’ – making it more complicated to understand EU-level policy-making 
only through the lens of Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist theory. Adding issue 
salience to the framework seems to have contributed to a better understanding of preferences 
of governments and their positioning at the supranational level.  
 When connecting African Union and European Union policies, one could argue that 
there is a certain mismatch between the approaches. Whereas the African Union has relied 
more on solidarity of its Member States and has tried to focus on the root causes of migration 
and displacement, the European Union seems to be mainly concerned with preventing 
migrants from entering its borders. In principle, this does not need to directly pose a problem 
as long as the EU would take its responsibility in another way: providing support in 
addressing the root causes of African migration. Yet, even with regard to its ‘partnership’ 
with Africa, which has yielded generally little results, its own needs have been prioritized and 
dolargely guide its action – of course, this does not add to its credibility. If it really wants to 
be perceived as a serious and trustworthy partner, it is maybe time for the EU to re-read the 
pledges it has made at the Tampere Council and to start to live up to these commitments.  
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